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The Claim of Judicial Finality:                                         






Justices of the Supreme Court, legal scholars, and reporters who cover 
judicial proceedings frequently claim that when the Court issues a 
constitutional decision it remains final unless the Court changes its mind or 
the Constitution is amended to reverse the Court. However, the record of more 
than two centuries offers an entirely different picture. Decisions by the 
Supreme Court lack finality on constitutional issues partly because the Court 
makes mistakes and has done so throughout its history. Human institutions, 
including the judiciary, are prone to miscalculation, including law, history, 
and political developments. After the Court issues a constitutional decision it 
does not deprive the elected branches from adopting policies directly contrary 
to what the Court has announced. This article offers many examples to 
demonstrate that constitutional interpretation is not centered entirely in the 
Supreme Court. The process involves all three branches, the states, scholars, 
and the general public. At times the Court recognizes the deficiency of an 
earlier decision and overrules it. However, the sole-organ error in Curtiss-
Wright (1936) was not corrected by the Court until its decision in Zivotofsky 
v. Kerry on June 8, 2015. On other occasions, the regular political process 
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In a 1953 opinion, Justice Robert Jackson remarked, “[w]e are not final 
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”1  
The sentence is surprising, coming from someone who, over the years, 
demonstrated unusual sophistication in understanding the Supreme Court’s 
role in democratic government.  Clearly, the Court has never been infallible or 
final, as Jackson fully understood when he wrote for the Court in 1943 to 
reverse the Court’s 8-1 flag-salute decision issued three years earlier.2  Why 
advance such a plainly inaccurate claim?  
Judicial review does not mean judicial finality or judicial supremacy.  It 
was never the intent of the Framers to vest final or exclusive authority in the 
Supreme Court on constitutional interpretation.  The Court has never 
functioned in that manner.  As with other branches of government, the Court 
                                                 
1  Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953), superseded by statute, 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214.  
2  W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overruling Minersville 
Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)). 
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has its highs and lows, contributing to individual rights and freedoms in some 
cases while undermining them in others.  It is fully capable of making errors.  
Chief Justice Rehnquist put the matter crisply in 1993: “It is an unalterable fact 
that our judicial system, like the human beings who administer it, is fallible.”3   
This article analyzes Supreme Court decisions to underscore the Court’s 
non-final role in deciding constitutional law.  Reasons for the selections vary: 
helping to trigger the Civil War (Dred Scott),4 a quick reversal because the 
Court’s composition changed (the Legal Tender Cases),5 a Justice switches his 
vote and we don’t know who or why (the 1895 Income Tax Cases),6 and 
invoking divine ordinances to prevent women from practicing law (Bradwell 
v. State).7  Other cases involve equal accommodation legislation,8 the separate-
but-equal standard,9 “liberty of contract,”10 mandatory sterilization,11 child-
labor legislation,12 misrepresenting John Marshall’s sole-organ speech 
(Curtiss-Wright),13 the flag-salute cases,14 and the Japanese-American cases.15  
Litigation after World War II includes the state-secrets Reynolds case,16 school 
busing,17 the trimester framework for abortion,18 an unworkable federalism 
model (National League of Cities),19 legislative vetoes,20 treating corporations 
as persons,21 and campaign finance.22   
The process of constitutional interpretation is not a judicial monopoly but 
rather a broad and continuing dialogue.  In an article published in 1998, Jack 
                                                 
3  Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993). 
4  Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by 
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV. 
5  Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 570 (1871). 
6  Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 157 U.S. 583 (1895), superseded by 
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend XVI. 
7  Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873).  
8  Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
9  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) . 
10  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
11  Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
12  Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
13  United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
14  W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642–43 (1943) (overruling 
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)). 
15  Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83, 63 S. Ct. 1375, 1377, 87 L. Ed. 
1774 (1943); Minoru Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115, 116 (1943); Korematsu 
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944);  
16  United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
17  Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
18  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
19  Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) overruled by Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).  
20  INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
21  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
22  Id. 




Balkin and Sanford Levinson objected that the current study of constitutional 
law “is too much centered on the opinions of the Supreme Court and lacks 
comparative and historical perspective.”23  Faulting the study of constitutional 
interpretation for its “worship of the Supreme Court and its 
pronouncements,”24 they selected three decisions for judicial error: Lochner,25 
Plessy,26 and Korematsu,27 while referring to Dred Scott as “infamous.”28  In 
an article published in 1998, Richard Primus selected Dred Scott, Plessy, and 
Lochner as so lacking in support that they rank as anticanon.29  Ian Bartrum’s 
2009 study focused largely on Lochner.30  
Jamal Greene in 2011 prepared an extensive analysis of the anticanon, 
directing attention to Dred Scott, Plessy, Lochner, and Korematsu.31  Four 
other cases he found “particularly poorly reasoned or morally challenged but . 
. . not, as a descriptive matter, anticanonical.”32  Scholars have identified other 
decisions as anticanon.33  Nominees to the Supreme Court are at times asked 
by Senators to comment on cases that fall within the category of anticanon.34 
The principle of judicial finality remains strongly held. In 2012, Jeffrey 
Toobin remarked that a Supreme Court decision “interpreting the Constitution 
can be overturned only by a new decision or by a constitutional amendment.”35  
Tom Goldstein, who frequently argues cases before the Supreme Court, stated 
in 2013 that when the Court “interprets the Constitution, that is the final word.  
The President and Congress can’t overturn its decision.  The only option is to 
                                                 
23  J. M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 963, 964 (1998). 
24   Id. at 965 n.8. 
25  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
26  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of 
Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954), supplemented sub nom. 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
27  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
28  Balkin & Levinson, supra note 23, at 1021. 
29  Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 
243, 248, 256–57 (1998).  Primus defines anticanon to mean “highly important but 
normatively undesirable” court rulings that are “in some senses a mirror image of the 
constitutional canon.”  Id. at 244 n.10. 
30  Ian Bartrum, The Constitutional Canon as Argumentative Metonymy, 18 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 327, 348 (2009). 
31  Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380 (2011). 
32  Id. (discussing Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842); Giles v. Harris, 189 
U.S. 475 (1903); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927); and Bowers v. Hardwick, 
478 U.S. 186 (1986)). 
33  Id. at 388–90 (collecting cases that scholars have described as anticanon) 
34  Id. at 392–93, 398–99. 
35  JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE OATH: THE OBAMA WHITE HOUSE AND THE SUPREME 
COURT 194 (2012). 
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amend the Constitution, which is basically impossible.”36  The cases analyzed 
in this article demonstrate that, contrary to the principal of judicial finality, the 
process of constitutional interpretation is much more fluid and non-final, and 
draws guidance from the elected branches and the general public.   
  
II. SELECTIONS BY CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES 
 
Writing in 1936, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes analyzed three cases 
to illustrate the capacity for judicial error.  In generally praising the Supreme 
Court, he recognized that it “has the inevitable failings of any human 
institution.”37  He acknowledged that “in three noticeable instances the Court 
has suffered severely from self-inflicted wounds” by deciding Dred Scott, the 
Legal Tender Cases, and the Income Tax Cases.38  
   
A. Dred Scott    
 
In Dred Scott, the Supreme Court considered two principal issues: could a 
black man sue in federal court, and did Congress possess authority to prohibit 
slavery in the territories?  James Buchanan, newly elected President, decided 
to entrust those constitutional questions exclusively to the Court.  His 
inaugural address of March 4, 1857, regarded slavery as presenting “a judicial 
question, which legitimately belongs to the Supreme Court of the United 
States, before whom it is now pending, and will, it is understood be speedily 
and finally settled.  To their decision, in common with all good citizens, I shall 
cheerfully submit, whatever this may be . . . .”39   
Buchanan was correct that the decision would be speedy.  The Court 
released its opinion two days later.40  Writing for the Court, Chief Justice 
Roger Taney held that Dred Scott as a black man was not a citizen of Missouri 
within the meaning of the Constitution and was not entitled to sue in federal 
court.41  For Taney, the “only matter in issue before the court, therefore, is 
whether the descendants of such slaves, when they shall be emancipated, or 
who are born of parents who had become free before their birth, are citizens of 
                                                 
36  Tom Goldstein, Power, SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2013, 6:49 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/ 06/power [https://perma.cc/3YER-DJPZ]. 
37  CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 45–
46 (1936). 
38   Id. at 50. 
39  MY FELLOW CITIZENS: THE INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES, 1789–2009, 132 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. & Fred L. Israel 
eds., 2010). 
40  Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403 (1857). 
41  Id. at 454. 




a State, in the sense in which the word citizen is used in the Constitution of the 
United States.”42 
Taney regarded blacks as “a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who 
had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, 
yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such 
as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant 
them.”43  Moreover, Congress had no constitutional authority to prohibit 
slavery in the territories.44  To Taney, the Constitution recognized “the right of 
property of the master in a slave” and made “no distinction between that 
description of property and other property owned by a citizen.”45 
Although President Buchanan accurately anticipated the swiftness of the 
Court’s ruling, he falsely predicted that the Court’s decision would render the 
slavery issue “finally settled.”46  The Court’s decision helped precipitate a civil 
war that left, out of a population of 30 million, more than 600,000 dead and 
400,000 wounded.47  To Chief Justice Hughes, even assuming “the sincerity 
of the judges who took this view, the grave injury that the Court sustained 
through its decision has been universally recognized.  Its action was a public 
calamity.”48 
Dred Scott, formally overturned by the Civil War Amendments, faced 
political repudiation long before.49  In his inaugural address in 1861, Abraham 
Lincoln denied that constitutional questions could be settled solely by the 
Supreme Court.50  If government policy on “vital questions affecting the whole 
people is to be irrevocably fixed” by the Court, “the people will have ceased 
to be their own rulers.”51  In legislation enacted in 1862, Congress asserted its 
independent constitutional authority by prohibiting slavery in the territories, 
with or without the Court’s support.52  In that same year, Attorney General 
Edward Bates released a legal opinion that shredded the reasoning of Dred 
Scott.53  He concluded that men of color, if born in America, are citizens of the 
                                                 
42  Id. at 403. 
43  Id. at 404–05. 
44  Id. at 447–52. 
45  Id. at 451. 
46  MY FELLOW CITIZENS: THE INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES 1789–2009, supra note 39.  
47   LOUIS FISHER & KATY J. HARRIGER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 790 
(11th ed., 2016). 
48  HUGHES, supra note 37, at 50.  
49  U.S. CONST. amends. XII, XIV, XV. 
50  MY FELLOW CITIZENS: THE INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES 1789–2009, supra note 39.  
51  Id. at 146.  
52  Abolition of Slavery Act (Territories), ch. 111, 12 Stat. 432 (1862).  
53  10 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 382 (1862). 
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United States.54  
 
B. Legal Tender Cases  
 
Chief Justice Hughes explained that in the years following Dred Scott the 
Court “was still suffering from lack of a satisfactory measure of public 
confidence.”55  Yet it chose, with the Legal Tender Cases in 1870–71, to act in 
a manner that once again “brought the Court into disesteem.”56  In 1866, 
Congress reduced the number of Justices “in order to deprive President 
[Andrew] Johnson of the opportunity to make appointments.”57  After Ulysses 
S. Grant became President, Congress increased the number of Justices to 
nine.58  There were two vacancies on the Court when it decided the first legal 
tender case, Hepburn v. Griswold.59  It involved a statute passed by Congress 
during the Civil War, treating paper money as legal tender for discharging 
prior debts.60  With a bench of seven Justices and three in dissent, the Court 
held that the money (“greenbacks”) was unconstitutional.61  Four Justices in 
the majority were Democrats; three dissenters were Republicans.62  In the 
lower federal courts, almost every Democratic judge declared the statute 
unconstitutional; nearly every Republican judge sustained it.63 
The retirement of Justice Robert Grier and the congressional authorization 
the previous year of a new Justice allowed President Grant to appoint two new 
members.64  Grant had reason to believe that both nominees would support the 
Legal Tender Act.65  William Strong, as a member of the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania, had already sustained the statute.66  Grant’s second choice, 
Joseph P. Bradley, appeared to be no less sympathetic.67  Fifteen months after 
the Legal Tender Act had been declared unconstitutional, the Court upheld it 
5 to 4.68  Strong and Bradley joined the original three dissenters to form the 
                                                 
54  Id. at 413. 
55  HUGHES, supra note 37, at 51. 
56  Id. 
57  Id.  
58  Id. at 51–52. 
59  Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870). 
60  Legal Tender Act, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 345 (1862) (authorizing the issue and 
redemption of United States notes for funding the floating debt of the United States). 
61  Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 626. 
62  Charles Fairman, Mr. Justice Bradley’s Appointment to the Supreme Court 
and the Legal Tender Cases, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1128, 1131 (1941). 
63  Id. 
64  Sidney Ratner, Was the Supreme Court Packed by President Grant?, 50 POL. 
SCI. Q. 343, 352 (1935). 
65  Id. at 351–52.   
66  Fairman, supra note 62, at 1128. 
67  Id. 
68  Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 570 (1871). 




majority.69  Chief Justice Hughes concluded: “From the standpoint of the effect 
on public opinion, there can be no doubt that the reopening of the case was a 
serious mistake and the overruling in such a short time, and by one vote, of the 
previous decision shook popular respect for the Court.”70  The second decision 
underscored that a constitutional decision depends not solely on conscientious, 
careful reasoning by Justices trained in the law, but on political judgments in 
Congress regarding the size of the Court and new appointments.  
 
C. Income Tax Cases 
 
Chief Justice Hughes’s third example of a judicial self-inflicted wound 
involves two decisions in 1895 on the taxing power.  Twenty-five years 
following the Legal Tender Cases, after the Court “had recovered its prestige, 
its action in the income tax cases gave occasion for a bitter assault.”71  A 
unanimous Court in 1881 upheld a federal income tax passed in 1864 to 
finance the Civil War.72  It did so by calling it an indirect tax, concluding that 
direct taxes (requiring apportionment under Article I, Section 9) “are only 
capitation taxes . . . and taxes on real estate.”73  Capitation taxes are also called 
“head taxes” (applied to each person).74   
In 1895, however, the Supreme Court held that a tax on rents or income of 
real estate was a direct tax and violated the Constitution by not being 
apportioned.75  On the question whether the income tax was a direct or indirect 
tax, the Justices were evenly divided, 4 to 4.76  Upon rehearing, a 5-4 decision 
invalidated the income tax, treating it as a direct tax to be apportioned on the 
basis of population.77  Justice Howell Edmunds Jackson, who did not 
participate in the first decision because of illness, voted in favor of the income 
tax in the second case.78  All things being equal, that should have produced a 
5-4 majority upholding the income tax.  However, another Justice switched his 
vote to build a majority against the income tax.79  Who he was, and why he 
switched, was not disclosed.80  The razor-thin majority and sudden reversal 
                                                 
69  Id.  See generally BRIAN MCGINTY, LINCOLN AND THE COURT 278–87 (2008) 
(discussing the background of the Legal Tender Cases). 
70  HUGHES, supra note 37, at 52. 
71  Id. at 53. 
72  Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1881). 
73  Id. at 602. 
74  1 CRAIG R. DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: POWERS OF 
GOVERNMENT 340 (9th ed., 2009). 
75  Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583 (1895). 
76  Id. at 586. 
77  Id. at 637. 
78  HUGHES, supra note 37, at 54. 
79  Id. 
80  Id. 
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undermined the reputation of the Court.  Not until 1913 did Congress and the 
states pass the Sixteenth Amendment to override the Court.81 
 
III. EARLY CHECKS ON JUDICIAL FINALITY 
 
It is instructive to review several cases in the nineteenth century that 
illustrate why Supreme Court decisions on constitutional matters are not 
necessarily final.  Initially, some Justices were astounded to learn that a 
Court’s constitutional decision could be reversed by the elected branches.82  
But in time, the Court learned it was not the only voice empowered to interpret 
the Constitution.   
 
A. McCulloch v. Maryland 
 
In 1819, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the U.S. 
Bank.83  Writing for the majority in McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall seemed 
to promote the doctrine of judicial supremacy.  He said that if a constitutional 
dispute must be decided, “by this tribunal alone can the decision be made. On 
the supreme court of the United States has the constitution of our country 
devolved this important duty.”84   
He overstated the Court’s role.  At issue in McCulloch was the decision of 
the two elected branches to create such an institution.85  It was their discretion 
to create or not.  Whether or not the Court blessed their efforts, a future 
Congress or President could make an independent decision about continuing 
the Bank.  If Congress decided against reauthorization, that decision was 
closed and final.  The Court had no part.  If Congress reauthorized the Bank 
and a President vetoed it, either on policy or constitutional grounds, the Bank 
was invalidated unless Congress could muster sufficient votes for an override.  
Those decisions by the elected branches could not be second-guessed or 
controlled by the Court.  McCulloch has been described as one of the “fixed 
stars in our constitutional constellation.”86  No one doubts its importance, but 
it did not establish judicial finality or supremacy. 
Congress decided in 1832 to reauthorize the Bank. President Andrew 
Jackson was urged to sign the bill because the Bank had been endorsed by 
previous Congresses, Presidents, and the Supreme Court.87  Supposedly he was 
duty bound to sign the bill.  Instead, he issued a veto, considering “mere 
                                                 
81  U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.  
82  See infra Section III.B. (discussing the Wheeling Bridge Cases from 1852 to 
1856 and the three dissents in the latter case). 
83  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 436–37 (1819). 
84  Id. at 401. 
85  Id. at 401–02. 
86  Greene, supra note 31, at 385. 
87  FISHER & HARRIGER, supra note 47, at 24. 




precedent” a “dangerous source of authority,” and explaining that it “should 
not be regarded as deciding questions of constitutional power except where the 
acquiescence of the people and the States can be considered as well settled.”88  
In reviewing the checkered history of the Bank, he noted that the elected 
branches favored a national bank in 1791, decided against it in 1811 and 1815, 
and returned their support in 1816.89  At the state level, legislative, executive, 
and judicial opinions on the constitutionality of the Bank were mixed.90  
Nothing in this record persuaded Jackson to sign the bill.  Congress sustained 
his veto.91  
To Jackson, even if Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion on the Bank in 1819 
“covered the whole ground of this act, it ought not to control the coordinate 
authorities of this Government.”92  All three branches, he said, “must each for 
itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution.”93  Each public official 
takes an oath to support the Constitution “as he understands it, and not as it is 
understood by others.”94  His veto message articulated the theory of coordinate 
construction.  It was as much the duty of the elected branches to decide the 
constitutionality of legislation as the judiciary.  The authority of the Supreme 
Court “must not, therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the 
Executive when acting in their legislative capacities, but to have only such 
influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve.”95  
The dispute over McCulloch applies to contemporary issues.  The Supreme 
Court in 1988 upheld the constitutionality of the independent counsel.96  
Nothing in that decision prevented Presidents from vetoing reauthorizing bills 
as an unconstitutional infringement of their control over the executive branch, 
and nothing prevented Congress from deciding not to reauthorize the 
independent counsel if it concluded that this office posed substantial concerns, 
including constitutional.  That is what happened in 1999 when Congress 
declined to reauthorize the independent counsel.97 
 
B. Wheeling Bridge Cases 
 
Judicial and congressional actions in the 1850s underscore why the 
Supreme Court need not have the final word on constitutional matters.  In 
                                                 
88  3 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1144–
45 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897–1925). 
89  Id. at 1145. 
90  Id. 
91  FISHER & HARRIGER, supra note 47, at 25–26. 
92  Id. 
93  Id. 
94  Id. 
95  Id. 
96  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696–97 (1998). 
97  LOUIS FISHER, DEFENDING CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 83–85 (2011). 
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1852, the Court decided that the height of the Wheeling Bridge over the Ohio 
River, constructed under Virginia state law, constituted a “nuisance” because 
the structure was so low it obstructed navigation.98  The Court appointed a 
commissioner to determine the facts about the bridge.99  By measuring its 
height, the water level, and the height of chimneys of approaching boats, the 
Commissioner decided the bridge represented an obstruction over a navigable 
stream.100  Judicial finality on a constitutional issue?  Not at all. 
The Court released its decision on February 6, 1852, and in amended form 
in May.101  On August 12, the House of Representatives debated a bill to make 
the Wheeling Bridge “a lawful structure.”102  A sponsor of this legislation 
insisted that the “ultimate right” to decide the issue “was in Congress” pursuant 
to its power to regulate interstate commerce and preserve the intercourse 
between states.103  Some lawmakers disagreed.  Representative Carlton B. 
Curtis asked: “Should Congress sit as a court of errors and appeals over the 
decision and adjudication of the Supreme Court of the United States, and 
consider matters which, without a doubt, properly belonged to that tribunal, 
and review them in a manner entirely unknown to law?”104 
However, was the dispute one of law or fact?  If the latter, the fact-finding 
capacity of the legislative branch was certainly equal, if not superior, to the 
judiciary.  The Court had shifted the investigation to the Commissioner.  Why 
should his judgment control Congress?  Senator George Edmund Badger 
denied that Congress was seeking “some revising power over the adjudications 
of the Supreme Court.”105  Congress was exercising “our legislative functions, 
as the court discharged its judicial functions.”106             
On this matter, the legislative process proved more informed, perceptive, 
and insightful than the judicial system.  The bill required vessels navigating 
the Ohio River “to conform the elevation of their chimneys to the height of the 
bridge, in the exercise of our undoubted right to regulate and control the 
commerce of the river.”107  Rather than altering the bridge to accommodate 
vessels, ships needed to adjust their height to the bridge.  The Supreme Court 
and its commissioner did not consider that option.108 
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Statutory language adopted on August 31, three months after the Court’s 
amended decision, provided that bridges across the Ohio River “are hereby 
declared to be lawful structures in their present position and elevation.”109  The 
statute required vessels navigating the Ohio River to ensure that any pipes and 
chimneys shall not “interfere with the elevation and construction of said 
bridges.”110  The dispute returned to the Supreme Court, with Pennsylvania 
insisting that the statute was “unconstitutional and void.”111  Writing for the 
majority, Justice Samuel Nelson explained that the Court in 1852 regarded the 
bridge as inconsistent with the authority of Congress to regulate interstate 
commerce.112  However, the new statute removed that objection.113  Because 
of the new statute, “the bridge is no longer an unlawful obstruction” and “it is 
quite plain the decree of the court cannot be enforced.”114 
Three dissenters strongly disagreed.  Justice John McLean recalled that 
Chief Justice Marshall said “that congress could do many things, but that it 
could not alter a fact.  This it has attempted to do in the above act.”115   McLean 
seemed to argue that the Court could alter a fact but Congress could not.  He 
concluded that the new statute, “being the exercise of a judicial and an 
appellate power,” was unconstitutional.116  Yet members of Congress regarded 
their action as the exercise of legislative, not judicial, power.117  Justice Robert 
Grier, in a second dissent, protested that the congressional action was 
unprecedented and “of dangerous example.”118  A third dissent came from 
Justice James Wayne, who regarded the congressional statute as 
unconstitutional.119 
The position of these dissenters has not prevailed.  States lacking authority 
over interstate commerce at one point can have their powers strengthened by 
an act of Congress.  As the Court noted in 1946, “whenever Congress’ 
judgment has been uttered affirmatively to contradict the Court’s previously 
expressed view that specific action taken by the states in Congress’ silence was 
forbidden by the commerce clause, this body has accommodated its previous 
judgment to Congress’ expressed approval.”120  In 1985, the Court said that 
when Congress “so chooses, state actions which it plainly authorizes are 
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invulnerable to constitutional attack under the Commerce Clause.”121  A 
concurrence in 1995 by Justices Kennedy and O’Connor conceded that “if we 
invalidate a state law, Congress can in effect overturn our judgment.”122 
 
C. State Control over Intoxicating Liquors 
 
Another judicial-congressional dialogue occurred in 1890 when the 
Supreme Court in Leisy v. Hardin ruled that Iowa’s prohibition of intoxicating 
liquors from outside its borders could not apply to original packages or kegs.123  
A firm in Illinois transported sealed kegs of beer to Keokuk, Iowa, where a 
state official seized the property and took it into custody because Iowa 
prohibited the sale of intoxicating liquors.124  The Court held that only after 
the original package entered Iowa and was broken into smaller packages could 
the state regulate the product.125  However, the Court added a caveat: the power 
of Congress over interstate commerce necessarily trumped the power of a state 
“unless placed there by congressional act.”126  States could not exclude 
incoming articles “without congressional permission.”127 
The final word on this constitutional question therefore belonged to 
Congress.  The Court issued its opinion on April 28, 1890.128  By May 14, the 
Senate reported a bill to grant Iowa authority to regulate incoming intoxicating 
liquors.129  Imaginative entrepreneurs had responded to the Court’s decision 
by opening up “original-package saloons” to block the state from exercising 
any control.130  Brewers and distillers from outside the state began packaging 
their goods “even in the shape of a vial containing a single drink.”131  
Congressional debate demonstrated the limitations of abstract Court doctrines 
(“original package”) that proved unworkable in practice.132  Congress was 
better informed than the Court. 
Lawmakers offered irreverent remarks about the Court’s capacity to 
exclusively decide this constitutional question.  Senator George Edmunds 
described the Court as “an independent and co-ordinate branch of the 
Government” empowered to decide cases, but “as it regards the Congress of 
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the United States, its opinions are of no more value to us than ours are to it. 
We are just as independent of the Supreme Court of the United States as it is 
of us, and every judge will admit it.”133  If members of Congress concluded 
that the Court made an error with its constitutional reasoning, “are we to stop 
and say that is the end of the law and the mission of civilization in the United 
States for that reason? I take it not.”134   
Congress enacted remedial legislation on August 6, 1890, slightly more 
than three months after the Court’s decision.135  The statute made intoxicating 
liquors, upon their arrival in a state or territory, subject to the police powers of 
a state “to the same extent and in the same manner as though such liquids or 
liquors had been produced in such State or Territory, and shall not be exempt 
therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original packages or 
otherwise.”136  When the constitutionality of this statute reached the Supreme 
Court a year later, it was upheld unanimously.137 
IV.  OTHER NINETEENTH-CENTURY LESSONS
Several decisions by the Supreme Court after the Civil War damaged its 
reputation as guardian of personal rights.  Individuals seeking protection from 
the courts lost on a regular basis.  Gradually they learned, as with women 
seeking to practice law, that their interests were better defended by legislative 
bodies at both the state and national level.  
A. Bradwell v. Illinois
After the Civil War, women began to study medicine and law and pursue 
other professional activities formerly dominated by men.138  As explained in 
the next Section, repeatedly they found legal support from legislative bodies, 
not from courts. William Blackstone’s doctrine of “coverture” placed women 
in a subordinate status, making husband and wife “one person in law: that is, 
the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the 
marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband; 
under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything.”139   
133  Id. at 4964. 
134  Id. 
135  Wilson Act, ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (limiting the effect of the regulations 
of commerce between the several States and with foreign countries in certain cases). 
136  Id. 
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138  LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESS: PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 69–70 (2016). 
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After studying law, Myra Bradwell applied for admission to the Illinois 
bar in 1869.140  She needed the approval of an all-male panel of judges to 
practice in the state.141  They rejected her application solely on the ground that 
she was a married woman.142  Her appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois 
failed.143  Of her qualifications the court said “we have no doubt.”144  British 
law and custom weighed heavily in the court’s analysis.  Female attorneys 
“were unknown in England,” and the suggestion that a woman could enter the 
courts as a barrister would have created “hardly less astonishment” than if she 
were elected to the House of Commons.145 
The Illinois court identified even higher authority: “That God designed the 
sexes to occupy different spheres of action, and that it belonged to men to 
make, apply and execute the laws, was regarded as an almost axiomatic 
truth.”146  The Illinois court advised that if change was needed, “let it be made 
by that department of the government to which the constitution has entrusted 
the power of changing the laws.”147  Bradwell took the judicial hint and sought 
assistance from the Illinois legislature, which in 1872 passed a bill stating that 
no person “shall be precluded or debarred from any occupation, profession or 
employment (except military) on account of sex.”148  
Bradwell brought the issue to the U.S. Supreme Court, hoping to establish 
a national right for women to practice law under the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.149  In a brief opinion, the Court denied 
that the right of women to practice law in the courts was a privilege belonging 
to citizens of the United States.150  A concurrence by Justice Bradley insisted 
that man “is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender.”151  The “natural 
and proper timidity and delicacy” of women made them “unfit” for many 
occupations.152  A “divine ordinance” commanded that a woman’s primary 
mission in life is to the home.153  While many women did not marry, a general 
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rule imposed upon females the “paramount destiny and mission” to fulfill the 
roles of wife and mother.154  To Bradley: “This is the law of the Creator.”155   
Considering Bradwell’s success with the Illinois legislature, could women 
turn to Congress for support in their efforts to practice law?  Several years after 
the Bradwell case, Belva Lockwood drafted language and worked closely with 
members of Congress to overturn the Court’s rule prohibiting women from 
practicing there.156  Her bill in 1878 provided that when any woman had been 
admitted to the bar of the highest court of a state, or of the supreme court of 
the District of Columbia, and was otherwise qualified as set forth in the bill 
(three years of practice and a person of good moral character, as with male 
attorneys), she may be admitted to practice before the U.S. Supreme Court.157  
Working in a Congress with all male members, her bill became law within one 
year.158  
Senator Aaron Sargent of California pushed hard for passage.159  His 
appeal looked to future opportunities in America, not to the doctrines of 
Blackstone and British precedents.160  Expressing a view that could not be 
found in state or federal court, he said men do not have the right “in 
contradiction to the intentions, the wishes, the ambitions, of women, to say 
that their sphere shall be circumscribed, that bounds shall be set which they 
cannot pass.”161  The pursuit of happiness “in her own way, is as much the 
birthright of woman as of man.”162  It was “mere oppression to say to the bread-
seeking woman, you shall labor only in certain narrow ways for your living, 
we will hedge out by law from profitable employments, and monopolize them 
for ourselves.”163 
Judicial attitudes about the rights of women and the law of coverture 
continued well into the twentieth century.164  Not until 1971 did the Supreme 
Court issue an opinion striking down sex discrimination.  A unanimous Court 
declared invalid an Idaho law that preferred men over women in administering 
estates.165  A study published that year denounced the failure of courts to 
defend the rights of women: “Our conclusion, independently reached, but 
completely shared, is that by and large the performance of American judges in 
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the area of sex discrimination can be succinctly described as ranging from poor 
to abominable.”166 
 
B. Civil Rights Cases of 1883 
 
In the same manner that the Supreme Court blocked the rights of women, 
so did it obstruct congressional efforts after the Civil War to extend rights to 
blacks.167  Although the Civil War amendments formally elevated blacks to the 
status of citizen, in many states they were denied access to public facilities.168  
Congressional legislation in 1875 entitled all persons in the United States to 
the “full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, 
and privileges of inns, public conveyances [transportation] on land and water, 
theaters, and other places of public amusement.”169  
In the House, Chair of the Judiciary Committee Benjamin Butler of 
Massachusetts rejected the charge that Congress was attempting to impose a 
national standard of “social equality” among blacks and whites.   The issue, he 
said, was one of law: “The colored men are either American citizens or they 
are not. . . . and the moment they were clothed with that attribute of citizenship, 
they stood on a political and legal equality with every other citizen, be he 
whom he may.”170  Social equality, he explained, has nothing to do with law.171  
Everyone has the right to select friends and associates.172  Those choices had 
nothing to do with access to public accommodations or to decide who someone 
sits next to in a theater, restaurant, or train.173  President Ulysses S. Grant 
signed the bill into law.174 
In the Civil Rights Cases (1883), the Court struck down the public 
accommodations provision as a federal encroachment on the states and an 
interference with private relationships.175  Only one Justice dissented, but it is 
one of the finest dissents ever written. Justice John Marshall Harlan reviewed 
precedents that covered public conveyances on land and water.176  States 
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created railroads as public highways for public use.177  Even if controlled and 
owned by private corporations, railroads functioned as public highways “for 
the convenience of the public.”178  Railroads acquired new territory because 
states seized land through the power of eminent domain.179  States regulated 
railroads by enacting speed and safety standards.180   
As to inns and taverns, Harlan acknowledged that private owners built 
them without the state assistance given to railroads.181  But an innkeeper 
offered lodging to travelers seeking shelter for the night.182 Under laws 
existing for centuries, it was an innkeeper’s duty to take all travelers and offer 
them room and food.183 The innkeeper functioned as a public servant.184  Places 
of public amusement received no state assistance, as with railroads, and there 
was no issue of needing shelter or food for the night.185  However, places of 
public amusement, including theaters, were not purely private 
establishments.186  They were established and licensed by public officials.187   
What Congress attempted to do in 1875 with respect to public 
accommodations finally prevailed, but not until almost a century later.  
Congress included in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 a section on public 
accommodations, relying on both the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
commerce power.188  Private groups lobbied for the bill, creating a political 
base that helped educate citizens and build public support.189  The rights of 
blacks were secured through this majoritarian process, not through judicial 
action.  In two unanimous decisions, the Court relied on the commerce power 
to uphold the public accommodation title.190  The active, driving, and reliable 
judgment in protecting constitutional rights of minorities came from the 
elected branches finally overcoming judicial obstruction. 
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From 1865 to the Civil Rights Cases of 1883, the Supreme Court issued a 
number of decisions that weakened the promise and commitment of the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.  The Slaughter-House 
Cases of 1873 expressed strong judicial support for independent state 
powers.191  The majority rejected interpretations of the Civil War Amendments 
that would “fetter and degrade the State governments by subjecting them to 
the control of Congress.”192  In United States v. Cruikshank (1876), the Court 
promoted the doctrine of “dual federalism,” attempting to establish a pure 
separation between federal and state powers: “The powers which one 
possesses, the other does not.”193  Under that theory, state sovereignty could 
prevail over national powers exercised through the Civil War Amendments.  
The protection of due process and equal protection would be left to the 
states.194 
In the years following the Civil War, there was no clear pattern in the 
South of segregating blacks and whites in transportation systems.195  
Sometimes blacks and whites traveled in the same railroad car.196  Southern 
transportation “was not rigidly segregated in the quarter-century after the Civil 
War.”197  By the late 1880s, however, some Southern states began passing Jim 
Crow transportation laws to separate blacks and whites.198  The timing here is 
significant.  This movement came after the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights 
Cases invalidated the equal accommodations statute passed by Congress.  
Through that decisive step the Court opened the door to the “separate but 
equal” doctrine in public accommodations, which would have been 
impermissible under the Civil Rights Act of 1875. 
In Plessy, the Court divided 7 to 1 in upholding a Louisiana statute enacted 
in 1890.199  The law required railway companies to provide equal but separate 
accommodations for white and black passengers, either by having two or more 
coaches for each train or by using a partition to divide the two races.200  For 
passengers who insisted on going into a coach or compartment where they did 
not belong, the state could impose fines or imprisonment.201  The statute made 
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one exception.202  It did not apply “to nurses attending children of the other 
race.”203  A conductor ordered Homer Plessy, seven-eighths Caucasian and 
one-eighth black, to leave the white coach and move to a black coach, and 
when he refused, a police officer removed him and he was imprisoned.204 
Justice Henry Billings Brown wrote for the majority to uphold the 
Louisiana statute, relying in part on the Civil Rights Cases that refused blacks 
equal accommodation to public facilities, including railroads.  Such 
restrictions, he said, “cannot be justly regarded as imposing any badge of 
slavery or servitude” under the Thirteenth Amendment.205  As to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, he sought guidance from the Slaughter-House Cases, 
which greatly undermined national authority provided in the Civil War 
Amendments and gave added protection to independent state rights.206 
Justice Brown said it was a question “whether the statute of Louisiana is a 
reasonable regulation, and with respect to this there must necessarily be a large 
discretion on the part of the legislature.”207  The Court extended no such 
deference to Congress when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875.  Brown 
added, “[i]f one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the 
United States cannot put them upon the same plane.”208  The case had nothing 
to do with social equality.  The issue was equal access to public facilities. 
In his dissent, Justice Harlan pointed out that no one disputed that a 
railroad “is a public highway” and that the corporation who owns and operates 
it exercises a public function.209  He predicted that Plessy would “prove to be 
quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott 
Case.”210  Plessy remained in force until the Supreme Court decided Brown v. 
Board of Education in 1954.211 
 
V. TWENTIETH-CENTURY CASES UP TO 1944 
 
Jamal Greene’s 2011 study singled out two twentieth-century decisions 
that merit being called anticanon: Lochner and Korematsu.212  Other cases 
cited as poorly reasoned in the twentieth century include the mandatory 
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sterilization case of Buck v. Bell (1927) and the sodomy case of Bowers v. 
Hardwick (1986).213  This section begins with Lochner and turns to Buck v. 
Bell, the child-labor cases, the “sole-organ” doctrine of Curtiss-Wright, the 
flag-salute case of 1940, and the Japanese-American cases.  Section V 




In Lochner v. New York (1905), the Court struck down a state law that 
limited bakery workers to 60 hours per week or ten hours per day.214  Justice 
Peckham, writing for a 5-4 majority, converted the general right to make a 
contract into laissez-faire doctrine.215  He found no “reasonable ground” to 
interfere with the liberty of an employee to contract for as many hours of work 
as desired.216  The statute seemed to him to serve no purpose in safeguarding 
public health or the health of the worker.217  Such laws he called “mere 
meddlesome interferences” with the rights of an individual to freely enter into 
contracts.218   
  In their dissent, Justices Harlan, White, and Day reviewed previous 
holdings of the Court that interpreted the police power of states to permit 
government regulation over the economy.219  In a separate dissent, Justice 
Holmes accused the majority of deciding “upon an economic theory which a 
large part of the country does not entertain.”220  The Constitution, he said, is 
“not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism 
and the organic relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez faire.”221 
Subsequent Court rulings did not adhere to judicial finality.  They were 
not entirely wedded to Lochner and its so-called “equality of right” for 
employers and employees to enter into a contract.  In 1908, for example, the 
Court sustained Oregon’s ten-hour day for women.222  A 5-4 Court in 1917 
upheld a congressional statute setting an eight-hour day for railroad workers 
engaged in interstate commerce.223  In that same year, the Court supported the 
constitutionality of Oregon’s ten-hour day for both men and women.224   In 
1923, a 5-3 Court swung back in the other direction by holding against a 
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congressional statute that provided for minimum wages for women and 
children in the District of Columbia.225 
The philosophy of Lochner survived as late as 1936 when a 5-4 Court 
struck down New York’s minimum wage law for women and children.226  
“Freedom of contract,” said the Court, “is the general rule and restraint the 
exception.”227  The 1923 Adkins decision was finally overruled in 1937, when 
a 5-4 Court upheld a minimum wage law for women and minors in the state of 
Washington.228  For more than three decades, the Court tried to impose a 
liberty-of-contract theory.  By 1941, three conservative Justices (Sutherland, 
Butler, and Van Devanter) had been replaced by more moderate Justices 
(Reed, Murphy, and Black).229  Subsequent decisions made it clear that 
policies concerning economic and social philosophy would include the elected 
branches, not decidedly exclusively by the courts.230 
 
B. Buck v. Bell 
 
Highly damaging to the Court’s reputation and the rights of individuals is 
Buck v. Bell (1927), upholding mandatory sterilization.231  Earlier decisions by 
federal and state courts rejected efforts to sterilize prisoners for reasons of 
eugenics.232  In 1914, a federal district court struck down a law that required a 
vasectomy for criminals convicted twice of a felony (even if “felonies” merely 
consisted of breaking an electric globe or unfastening a strap on a harness).233  
The court regarded mandatory vasectomy a cruel and unusual punishment that 
“belongs to the dark ages.”234  A Nevada law on mandatory sterilization was 
struck down in 1918 because it gave judges too much discretion.235 
A Virginia court in 1925 upheld the state’s mandatory sterilization law as 
a proper use of the police power to prevent the transmission of insanity, idiocy, 
imbecility, epilepsy, and crime.236  The case involved Carrie Buck, who had 
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been placed in a state institution at age 18.237  Her mother had been committed 
to the same institution, and Carrie had given birth to an illegitimate child the 
state claimed to be of “defective mentality.”238  By an 8-to-1 majority, a three-
page opinion by Justice Holmes in Buck v. Bell affirmed the state law.239 
The decision is marred in several ways.  The case was wholly contrived 
without any adversarial quality.  Irving Whitehead, Carrie’s attorney, was a 
longtime friend of the state legislators who drafted the sterilization law.240  He 
served on the board of the institution in which Carrie lived.241  While on the 
board, he helped approve the sterilization of more than two dozen women.242  
In that capacity he worked with the institution’s physician who regularly 
advocated sterilization and made that recommendation for Carrie.243  As a 
“friendly suit” brought by two parties agreeing on the same outcome, the 
Supreme Court lacked the necessary benefit of briefs and oral argument by 
rival adversaries who could properly inform the Court.244   
Had the regular judicial process been followed, the Court would have 
learned that school records indicated that Carrie was a normal child and that 
she became pregnant when raped by the nephew of the foster parents Carrie 
lived with.245  There was no evidence that Carrie’s child was feebleminded.246  
Justice Holmes defended the state law by arguing that if the government can 
send men to war to be injured and even killed, it could order the lesser penalty 
of mandatory sterilization of the “unfit.”247  It would be difficult to find Court 
language more poorly reasoned.  He closed with: “The principle that sustains 
compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. 
Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”248 
Buck v. Bell has never been explicitly overruled.  In 1942, the Supreme 
Court struck down an Oklahoma statute that provided for mandatory 
sterilization of “habitual criminals,” but the law provided an exception for 
certain offenses, including embezzlement.249  To the Court, permitting the 
sterilization of someone who had been convicted once for stealing chickens 
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and twice for robbery violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.250 
Although never formally overruled in the courts, the reasoning and results 
of Buck v. Bell have been thoroughly discredited by the elected branches.  In 
2002, Virginia Governor Mark Warner formally apologized for the state’s 
policy on eugenics, under which some 8,000 people were involuntarily 
sterilized from 1927 to 1979.251  Reflecting the views of the state legislature in 
2002, he said the eugenics movement “was a shameful effort in which state 
government never should have been involved.”252  Nationwide, the practice 
affected an estimated 65,000 Americans.253  In 2012, a North Carolina task 
force investigated the state’s record of mandatory sterilization from 1929 to 
1974 and proposed financial compensation for each living victim.254  
 
C. Child-Labor Legislation 
 
The reputation of the Court for reliable constitutional interpretation was 
severely damaged by two decisions that struck down congressional efforts to 
regulate child labor.  By the turn of the twentieth century, private organizations 
and political parties began to lobby Congress to eliminate the harsh and 
unhealthy conditions of child labor.255  Initial efforts began at the state level 
until it became clear that national legislation was needed.256  In 1916, the 
House Labor Committee concluded that “the entire problem has become an 
interstate problem rather than a problem of isolated States and is a problem 
which must be faced and solved only by a power stronger than any State.”257  
Legislation regulating child labor became law on September 1, 1916.258  It 
prohibited the shipment in interstate or foreign commerce of any article 
produced by children within specified age ranges: under the age of 16 for 
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products from a mine or quarry, and under the age of 14 from any mill, 
cannery, workshop, factory, or manufacturing establishment.259 
Two years later, a 5-4 Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart struck down the 
statute as unconstitutional.260 The Court ruled that the steps of “production” 
and “manufacture” of goods were local in origin and therefore not part of 
“commerce” among the states subject to regulation by Congress.261  The Court 
reasoned that although child labor might be harmful, the goods shipped from 
their efforts “are of themselves harmless.”262  To the majority, efforts to deal 
with child labor must be left to the states.  The dissenters argued that Congress, 
not the Court, was the agency of government constitutionally authorized to 
determine and settle these policy questions.  They disagreed that it was 
permissible to allow regulation “against strong drink but not as against the 
product of ruined lives.”263 
Members of Congress did not regard the Court’s decision as the final word. 
Instead, they prepared legislation to regulate child labor through the taxing 
power.  A federal excise tax would be levied on the net profit of persons 
employing child labor within prohibited ages.264  The bill passed Congress and 
became law in 1919.265  When the issue reached the Supreme Court, Solicitor 
General James M. Beck urged the Justices to exercise institutional and political 
restraint when reviewing legislation supported by the elected branches.266  
The Court ignored Beck’s counsel, striking down the new child labor law 
by a vote of 8 to 1.267  Justice Clarke dissented without providing any reason.268  
Congress passed a constitutional amendment in 1924 to empower it to regulate 
child labor.  By 1937, only 28 of the necessary 36 states had ratified it.269  
Beginning in 1937, conservative Justices began to retire, giving President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt his first opportunity to name Justices to the Court.270  
With this change in the Court’s composition underway, Congress in 1938 
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passed legislation to regulate child labor, relying on the same power that the 
Court had earlier invalidated: the Commerce Clause.271  
In 1941, a thoroughly reconstituted (and chastened) Court not only upheld 
the new statute but did so unanimously.272  Moreover, it proceeded to publicly 
apologize for the Court’s earlier effort to distinguish between the “production” 
and “manufacture” of goods (regarded as local in origin) and interstate 
commerce subject to regulation by Congress.273  Writing for the Court, Chief 
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone noted: “While manufacture is not of itself interstate 
commerce the shipment of manufactured goods interstate is such commerce 
and the prohibition of such shipment by Congress is indubitably a regulation 
of the commerce.”274  Congress may exclude from interstate commerce 
whatever goods it considers injurious to the public health, morals, or 
welfare.275  Those constitutional judgments, said the Court, are left to the 
elected branches, not the judiciary.  To Chief Justice Stone, the reasoning 
offered by the Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart “was novel when made and 
unsupported by any provision of the Constitution.”276  No support in the 





In dicta by Justice George Sutherland in United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corp., the Court departed from the core issue presented to it—whether 
Congress could delegate power to the President in the field of international 
relations—and instead announced an erroneous definition of exclusive and 
plenary presidential power in foreign affairs.277  The case resulted from 
legislation passed by Congress in 1934, authorizing the President to prohibit 
the sale of arms in the Chaco region in South America whenever he found “it 
may contribute to the reestablishment of peace” between belligerents.278  At 
issue was legislative, not presidential, power.  When President Roosevelt 
imposed the embargo, he relied solely on statutory authority.  His proclamation 
prohibiting the sale of arms and munitions began: “NOW, THEREFORE, I, 
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of America, 
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acting and by virtue of the authority conferred in me by the said joint resolution 
of Congress . . . .”279  
Litigation focused on legislative power because the Court in 1935 twice 
struck down delegation by Congress of domestic power to the President.280  
The issue in Curtiss-Wright was therefore whether Congress could delegate 
this particular legislative power in international affairs.281  A district court, 
holding that the joint resolution impermissibly delegated legislative authority, 
said nothing about any reservoir of exclusive or plenary presidential power.282 
The case was taken directly to the Supreme Court.  None of the briefs on 
either side discussed the availability of exclusive and plenary powers for the 
President in foreign affairs.283  To the Justice Department, the question went 
to “the very power of Congress to delegate to the Executive authority to 
investigate and make findings in order to implement a legislative purpose.”284  
The source of authority was plainly legislative.  The brief for the private 
company, Curtiss-Wright, focused on the delegation of legislative power and 
did not explore the existence of exclusive and plenary presidential power.285  
A separate brief, prepared for other private parties, concentrated on the 
delegation of legislative power and did not identify any freestanding or 
freewheeling presidential authority.286  
Writing for the Court, Justice Sutherland reversed the district court and 
upheld the delegation of legislative power to the President to place an arms 
embargo on the Chaco region.287  That should have marked the end of his 
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decision, but in dicta he began to introduce a number of errors.288  Scholars 
took Sutherland to task for twisting historical and constitutional precedents.289 
Sutherland claimed that the Constitution commits treaty negotiation 
exclusively to the President: “He makes treaties with the advice and consent 
of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate 
cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.”290  To understand 
why that is false, one need only refer to Sutherland’s book, published in 1919, 
which reflects his experience as a U.S. Senator.  He acknowledged that his 
colleagues participated in the negotiation phase and Presidents acceded to this 
“practical construction.”291  Presidents also invited members of the House of 
Representatives to participate in treaty negotiation as a means of building 
political support for authorization and appropriation bills needed to implement 
treaties.292 
Another error is Sutherland’s plain distortion of a speech John Marshall 
gave in 1800 as a member of the House of Representatives.   Sutherland used 
that speech to create for the President a source of power in foreign affairs that 
was not grounded in authority delegated by Congress:  
 
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not 
alone with an authority vested in the President by an assertion 
of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very 
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the 
sole organ of the federal government in the field of 
international relations . . . .293  
 
Marshall’s speech included this sentence: “The President is the sole organ of 
the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign 
nations.”294  The phrase “sole organ” is ambiguous.  “Sole” means exclusive 
but what is “organ”?  Simply the President’s duty to communicate to other 
nations U.S. policy decided by the elected branches?  Anyone reading the 
entire speech would understand that Marshall did not advocate exclusive or 
plenary power for the President in external affairs.  Such an interpretation 
would ignore the plain text of Articles I and II of the Constitution. 
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The purpose of Marshall’s speech was to defend the decision of President 
John Adams to carry out an extradition provision of the Jay Treaty.  Adams 
was not the sole organ in formulating the treaty.  He was the sole organ in 
implementing it.295  In subsequent years, the Supreme Court and lower courts 
regularly cited the sole-organ doctrine in Curtiss-Wright but failed to 
understand what Marshall actually meant.296  Repeating Sutherland’s dicta 
without reading the speech injured the reputation of the judiciary as 
constitutional interpreter, improperly inflated presidential power, and 
weakened the system of checks and balances.297 
Because of litigation on the Jerusalem passport case, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 
the Supreme Court had an opportunity to correct the erroneous dicta added to 
Curtiss-Wright.  On July 17, 2014, I filed an amicus brief with the Court 
identifying the errors and asking the Court to issue corrections.298  While the 
Court is in session, the National Law Journal runs a column called “Brief of 
the Week.”  It selected my amicus brief in Zivotofsky and chose this title: “Can 
the Supreme Court Correct Erroneous Dicta?”299  The Court did jettison the 
sole-organ doctrine in 2015 but retained other errors from Curtiss-Wright, 
including the notion that treaty negotiation is committed exclusively to the 
President.300 
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E. Flag-Salute Case of 1940 
 
In 1940, a commanding 8-1 majority of the Supreme Court upheld a 
compulsory flag salute that forced children to violate their religious beliefs.301   
The parents of two Jehovah’s Witness children objected that the flag salute 
violated their interpretation of the biblical provision not to bow down to any 
graven image.302  In 1937, a federal district judge declared the statute 
unconstitutional.303  School authorities concluded that a refusal to salute the 
flag constituted an act of insubordination requiring expulsion.304  To the 
federal judge, the state could not violate religious beliefs unless it could 
demonstrate that it was necessary for the public safety, health, morals, 
property, or personal rights.305  The Third Circuit upheld this decision, finding 
it difficult to see “the essential relationship between infant patriotism and the 
martial spirit.”306   
On the last day of the Court’s term, June 3, 1940, Justice Frankfurter 
upheld the compulsory flag salute.307  He relied on a central premise: “National 
unity is the basis of national security.”308  From there he concluded that forcing 
children to salute the flag against their religious beliefs helps foster national 
unity.  He asserted, “[t]he ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding 
tie of cohesive sentiment.”309  The dissent by Justice Stone rejected 
Frankfurter’s emphasis on national security and national unity: “History 
teaches us that there have been but few infringements of personal liberty by 
the state which have not been justified, as they are here, in the name of 
righteousness and the public good, and few which have not been directed, as 
they are now, at politically helpless minorities.”310  
Far from accepting the Court’s decision as the exclusive and final word on 
the meaning of the Constitution, Frankfurter’s opinion was assailed by law 
journals, the press, and religious organizations.  The New Republic, which 
Frankfurter helped found, warned that the country was “in great danger of 
adopting Hitler’s philosophy in the effort to oppose Hitler’s legions,” accusing 
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the Court of coming “dangerously close to being a victim of [war] hysteria.”311  
Out of 39 law reviews that discussed Gobitis, 31 raised objections, while 
newspapers condemned the Court for violating individual rights and buckling 
to popular prejudices.312  Editorials in 171 newspapers tore apart Frankfurter’s 
opinion.313 
Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy came to regret their decision to 
support Frankfurter.  In 1942, they publicly announced that Gobitis was 
“wrongly decided,”314 leaving Frankfurter with a narrow 5-4 majority.315  
Chief Justice Hughes retired in 1941 and was succeeded by Stone.316  Two 
Justices who joined with Frankfurter (Byrnes and Roberts) were replaced by 
Wiley Rutledge and Robert H. Jackson.317  Rutledge’s opinions while on the 
D.C. Circuit suggested he would vote against Frankfurter.318 
Jackson, writing for a 6-3 majority, overruled Gobitis.319  He prepared a 
masterful defense of individual freedom and religious liberty, but credit for the 
reversal belongs to those who refused to accept Frankfurter’s opinion as the 
final word.  Citizens around the country told the Court it did not understand 
the Constitution, minority rights, or religious liberty.  Their independent voices 
prompted Black, Douglas, and Murphy to rethink their positions and switch 
sides. 
 
F. Japanese-American Cases 
 
In Korematsu v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the relocation 
of Japanese Americans (two-thirds of them U.S. citizens) to detention 
camps.320  With no evidence of disloyalty or subversive activity and without 
benefit of any procedural safeguards, the United States imprisoned Japanese 
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Americans solely on grounds of race.321  The previous year, in Hirabayashi v. 
United States, the Court upheld a curfew placed on Japanese Americans on the 
west coast.322 
Dissenting in Korematsu, Justice Murphy protested that the exclusion was 
based on an “erroneous assumption of racial guilt” found in General John 
DeWitt’s report, which referred to all individuals of Japanese dissent as 
“subversives” belonging to “an enemy race” whose “racial strains are 
undiluted.”323  In dissent, Justice Jackson deferred to executive-military 
judgments.324  With “no real evidence before it,” the Court had “no choice but 
to accept General DeWitt’s own unsworn, self-serving statement, untested by 
any cross-examination, that what he did was reasonable.  And thus it will 
always be when courts try to look into the reasonableness of a military 
order.”325 
Jackson had an opportunity to probe the basis for the exclusion order.  He 
claimed the Court had “no choice.”326  Justices always have a choice.  Certainly 
they had a choice in analyzing a DeWitt statement that was unsworn, self-
serving, and untested by cross-examination.  A dissent by Justice Murphy 
identified an effective and principled way to challenge executive assertions: 
“justification for the exclusion is sought, instead, mainly upon questionable 
racial and sociological grounds not ordinarily within the realm of expert 
military judgment.”327  The Court was not faced with what might be called a 
“military judgment.”  There was no reason to defer to DeWitt’s purely 
prejudiced and ignorant beliefs about race and sociology.328 
On February 20, 1976, President Gerald Ford publicly apologized for the 
treatment of Japanese Americans, resolving that “this kind of action shall never 
again be repeated.”329  A congressional commission in December 1982 stated 
that Roosevelt’s executive order “was not justified by military necessity.”  The 
policies of curfew and detention “were not driven by analysis of military 
conditions.”330  The factors shaping those decisions were “race prejudice, war 
hysteria and a failure of political leadership.”331  One could add: abandonment 
of judicial independence.  
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The wrongs done in Hirabayashi and Korematsu were later corrected by 
lower federal courts, not by the Supreme Court.332  Hirabayashi and 
Korematsu returned to court after newly discovered documents revealed that 
executive officials had deceived the judiciary.333  They learned that the 
executive branch had withheld vital evidence from the courts.334  The Justice 
Department had a duty to inform the judiciary about false allegations.  Its brief 
should have clearly identified the errors.335  Instead, a footnote was so 
reworked and watered down that the courts could not possibly have understood 
the extent to which the administration had misled them.336  
 After Korematsu brought a coram nobis case, charging fraud against the 
Court, a district court in 1984 concluded that the executive branch had 
“knowingly withheld information from the courts when they were considering 
the critical question of military necessity in this case.”337  The record provided 
“substantial support” that the government “deliberately omitted relevant 
information and provided misleading information in papers before the 
court.”338  The district court vacated Korematsu’s conviction and the Justice 
Department did not appeal.339 
Hirabayashi challenged his conviction for violating the curfew order.340  
The Justice Department had argued that the government lacked time to 
separate loyal Japanese Americans from those who might be subversive.341  
However, General DeWitt believed that because of racial ties, filial piety, and 
strong bonds of common tradition, culture, and customs, it was “impossible to 
establish the identity of the loyal and the disloyal with any degree of safety.”342  
For DeWitt, there was no “such a thing as a loyal Japanese.”343  The initial 
draft report contained his remarks but the final report, after War Department 
editing, did not.344  The Justice Department received the final report but not 
the draft version.345 
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In 1986, a district court ruled that although the Justice Department “did 
not knowingly conceal” from Hirabayashi’s counsel and the Supreme Court 
the racial grounds DeWitt offered for excluding Japanese, it was necessary to 
charge the executive branch with concealment because the information was 
known to the War Department, an arm of government.346  The failure by the 
executive branch to disclose DeWitt’s position “was an error of the most 
fundamental character.”347  Hirabayashi “was in fact seriously prejudiced by 
that non-disclosure in his appeal from his conviction for failing to report.”348 
The district court vacated that conviction but declined to vacate his conviction 
for violating the curfew order.349  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated both 
convictions.350   
VI.  THE JUDICIAL RECORD AFTER WORLD WAR II
Supreme Court decisions analyzed in this section cover the state secrets 
case of United States v. Reynolds, school busing initiatives by the Supreme 
Court, the trimester framework of Roe v. Wade, the federalism decision of 
National League of Cities, legislative vetoes, designating corporations as 
persons, and campaign finance. 
A. State Secrets Case of 1953
In response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Bush administration 
invoked the “state secrets privilege” to block efforts by private litigants to gain 
access to agency documents to challenge constitutional violations, including 
warrantless surveillance and the policy of “extraordinary rendition” used to 
transfer individuals to other countries for interrogation and torture.351  The 
Justice Department advised federal courts that the cases could not proceed 
without jeopardizing national security and foreign policy.352  If courts defer to 
that argument, the executive branch is at liberty to violate statutes and 
individual rights without any judicial checks.  
The executive branch relied heavily on United States v. Reynolds (1953), 
the first time the Supreme Court recognized the state secrets privilege in its 
full scope.353  The case involved a B-29 that exploded over Waycross, Georgia, 
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on October 6, 1948.354  The widows of three civilian engineers killed in the 
crash filed a tort claims action and asked for the official accident report to 
determine if there had been government negligence.355  Their attorneys 
submitted a number of interrogatories to the government, asking whether the 
government had prescribed modifications for the B-29 to prevent overheating 
of the engines to reduce fire hazards.356  If modifications had been carried out, 
the interrogatory asked for details.357  In each case the government answered 
“No.”358  When the three families discovered the declassified accident report 
in 2000, they realized the government’s answer was false.359 
District Judge William Kirkpatrick decided on June 30, 1950, that the 
accident report on the B-29 crash was not “privileged.”360  He directed the 
government to give him the accident report to be read in his chambers.361  
When the government refused, he ruled for the widows.362  On December 11, 
1951, a unanimous Third Circuit upheld his decision.363  If it allowed the 
privilege, it said it would be a small step “to assert a privilege against the 
disclosure of records merely because they might prove embarrassing to 
government officers.”364  To permit the government as a party to “conclusively 
determine the Government’s claim of privilege is to abdicate the judicial 
function and permit the executive branch of the Government to infringe the 
independent province of the judiciary as laid down by the Constitution.”365  
Both the district court and the Third Circuit properly defended judicial 
independence. 
The government’s brief to the Supreme Court continued to muddle the 
basic issue by writing, “to the extent that the report reveals military secrets 
concerning the structure or performance of the plane that crashed or deals with 
these factors in relation to projected or suggested secret improvements it falls 
within the judicially recognized ‘state secret’ privilege.”366  To the extent?  Did 
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the report contain state secrets or not?  That question could be answered only 
if the Court read the report, which it chose not to do.367 
 For a 6-3 Court, Chief Justice Fred Vinson announced incoherent 
principles of judicial responsibility.368  He said the Court “itself must 
determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, 
and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is 
designed to protect.”369  Disclosure to the public is a legitimate concern, but 
there is no such risk when Justices read an accident report in their chambers.  
By failing to examine the report, the Court could not possibly determine 
“whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege.”370  The 
Court accepted at face value a self-serving statement by the executive branch, 
an assertion that turned out to be false.371  
 Through disjointed reasoning, Vinson placed courts in an inferior 
institutional position.  Without looking at the accident report, the Court could 
not independently evaluate the merits of a privilege claimed by an executive 
official.  Nor could it protect the rights of the three widows.  The Court 
surrendered to the executive branch fundamental judicial duties in deciding 
questions of privilege and access to evidence.  Refusing to examine the report, 
the Court took the risk of being hoodwinked by the executive branch.  As it 
turned out, it was.  
In 2000, the three widows obtained a copy of the declassified accident 
report.372  In reading the report, their attorneys realized it contained no state 
secrets.373  It did, however, reveal that the government had been negligent by 
not installing heat shields in the B-29 to avoid overheating of the engines.374  
The Air Force committed other negligent acts.375  The executive branch misled 
the Court in 1953 just as it did with the Japanese-American cases.  The families 
filed a writ of coram nobis, charging that the executive branch had misled the 
judiciary and committed fraud against it.376  They filed the writ first with the 
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Supreme Court, but the Court declined to take it.377  They had to start over in 
district court.378 
The widows lost in district court on September 10, 2004, and their appeal 
to the Third Circuit failed on September 22, 2005.379  On May 1, 2006, the 
Supreme Court denied cert.380  The constitutional value given short shrift in 
this coram nobis is the need to protect the integrity, independence, and 
reputation of the federal judiciary and the rights of private litigants.  When 
courts operate in that manner, citizens lose faith in the judiciary, the rule of 
law, the adversary legal system, and the constitutional principle of checks and 
balances. 
From 2006 to 2010, I worked with the House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees on legislation designed to increase judicial independence in state 
secrets cases.  Judges would look at documents in camera instead of taking at 
face value the government’s assertions offered in various declarations and 
affidavits.  I presented testimony before both committees in support of the 
legislation.381  The committees marked up their bills and reported them, but 
there was no floor debate on legislation that would go to the President. 
When President Obama took office he objected that the state secrets 
privilege had been overused by the Bush II administration, including cases 
involving torture.382  Yet his Justice Department continued to apply the 
privilege to cases it inherited and invoked it in new litigation, with federal 
courts generally deferring to executive claims that documents sought in court 
may not be read by plaintiffs or federal judges.383  Reynolds need not be the 
last word.  The elected branches have both a duty and authority to increase 
judicial independence in these cases.  Leadership is more likely to come from 
Congress, given the general preference of the executive branch for withholding 
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B. School Busing 
 
The Supreme Court’s desegregation decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954) did little to integrate public schools.  Part of the delay came 
from vague guidelines issued by the Court the next year, in Brown v. Board of 
Education (1955), directing states to move “with all deliberate speed.”384  As 
late as 1964, the Court complained there “has been entirely too much 
deliberation and not enough speed” in enforcing Brown.385  Two years later a 
federal appellate court remarked: “A national effort, bringing together 
Congress, the executive and the judiciary may be able to make meaningful the 
right of Negro children to equal educational opportunities.  The courts acting 
alone have failed.”386 
In 1971, a unanimous Court held that district courts possessed broad power 
to fashion remedies to desegregate schools.387  To achieve greater racial 
balance, judges could alter school district lines, reassign teachers, and bus 
students.388  That same year a unanimous Court struck down state antibusing 
laws.389  Busing spread to non-southern states, including Denver, Colorado and 
Michigan.390 
Decisions that had been either unanimous or with a 7-1 majority now gave 
way to split decisions.  Two other northern school systems, in Columbus and 
Dayton, Ohio, came before the Supreme Court.391  Because there had been de 
jure segregation, school officials were required to take steps to desegregate.392  
Chief Justice Burger remarked that it “is becoming increasingly doubtful that 
massive public transportation really accomplishes the desirable objectives 
sought.”393  Justice Powell, in a dissent, warned that parents resentful of court-
ordered integration might withdraw their children from public schools by 
relocating (“white flight”) or enroll them in private schools.394  Either action 
would lead to resegregation of public schools.395  
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 As described by constitutional scholar Jeffrey Rosen, court-ordered 
busing “produced a firestorm of resistance from the president and Congress 
that never abated.”396  A Gallup poll in 1973 found a clear majority backing 
integration but only 5 percent supporting busing.397  Court-ordered busing 
reflected “judicial unilateralism of the most aggressive kind.”398  Confronted 
with congressional and presidential opposition, federal judges “proved unable 
and ultimately unwilling to impose an unpopular and destabilizing social 
reform on their own.”399  Eventually, the judiciary abandoned busing as a 
remedy for desegregation.400 
 
C. Roe v. Wade 
 
The Supreme Court faced a complex and politically charged issue in Roe 
v. Wade (1973).401  How could abortions be performed to satisfy the competing 
values of those who wanted abortion on demand and those who believed in an 
embryo’s right to life?  Various states wrestled with the issue.  It became a 
national controversy when the Court decided to “settle it” for the entire 
country.  The decision represented a serious political and institutional 
miscalculation.  As Linda Greenhouse has noted, the manner in which the 
Court handled the issue deeply split the nation and gave “rise to the religious 
Right,”402 a political development that continues to this day. 
Justice Blackmun wrote for a 7-to-2 Court, with Justices White and 
Rehnquist in dissent.403  Concurrences by Justices Stewart and Douglas and 
Chief Justice Burger added to the fragmentation.404  The Court struck down a 
Texas statute that prohibited abortion except on medical advice for the purpose 
of saving the woman’s life.405  It held that a woman’s right to privacy, whether 
found in the Fourteenth Amendment or the Ninth Amendment, “is broad 
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enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy.”406  However, it disagreed that a woman “is entitled to terminate 
her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for whatever reason she 
alone chooses.”407  It accepted as “reasonable and appropriate” for a state to 
decide that at some point in time it may legislate to protect the health of the 
mother and potential human life.408 
Blackmun placed the state’s compelling interest “at viability,” which he 
took to mean the ability of a fetus to survive “outside the mother’s womb.”409  
Medical technology was rapidly changing the concept of viability, with the 
fetus able to survive outside the mother’s womb at much earlier stages.  
Blackmun created a system of three periods (a trimester model) to decide the 
rights of women and state authorities.410 
In dissent, Rehnquist objected that “the conscious weighing of competing 
factors that the Court’s opinion apparently substitutes for the established test 
is far more appropriate to a legislative judgment than to a judicial one.”411  
White’s dissent, printed in a companion case, remarked: “As an exercise of 
raw judicial power, the Court perhaps has authority to do what it does today; 
but in my view its judgment is an improvident and extravagant exercise of the 
power of judicial review that the Constitution extends to this Court.”412 
An early critique of Roe by John Hart Ely identified some principal 
weaknesses.413 Blackmun’s opinion consisted of “drawing lines with an 
apparent precision one generally associates with a commissioner’s regulations. 
On closer examination, however, the precision proves largely illusory.”414  Ely 
noted that the concept of viability “will become even less clear than it is now 
as the technology of birth continues to develop.”415  The “problem with Roe is 
not so much that it bungles the question it sets itself, but rather that it sets itself 
a question the Constitution has not made the Court’s business.”416  
Support for the trimester framework continued to erode as new Justices, 
including Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy, 
joined the Court.  The changed composition of the Court was evident in a 1989 
decision, which reviewed a Missouri statute that imposed a number of 
restrictions on a woman’s decision to have an abortion.417  Without overruling 
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Roe, a plurality opinion by Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy rejected the 
trimester framework.418  Scalia would have repealed all of Roe.419  In 1992, the 
Court finally abandoned the trimester framework.  An opinion by O’Connor, 
Kennedy, and Souter specifically rejected it.420  Stevens and Blackmun 
disagreed with the rejection.421  In their separate opinion, Rehnquist, White, 
Scalia, and Thomas stated that Roe “was wrongly decided,” apparently 
agreeing with the framework’s rejection without expressly saying so.422  
What was learned from Roe v. Wade?  Writing in 1985 while serving on 
the D.C. Circuit, Ruth Bader Ginsburg said the decision became “a storm 
center” and “sparked public opposition and academic criticism,” in part 
“because the Court ventured too far in the change it ordered and presented an 
incomplete justification for its action.”423  In 1992, after the Court rejected the 
trimester framework and she was confirmed as Associate Justice, Ginsburg 
explained:  
 
[J]udges play an interdependent part in our democracy. They 
do not alone shape legal doctrine, but . . . they participate in a 
dialogue with other organs of government, and with the 
people as well. . . .  Measured motions seem to me right, in 
the main, for constitutional as well as common law 
adjudication.424  
 
A “less encompassing” decision, she said, “might have served to reduce rather 
than to fuel controversy.”425 
 
D. National League of Cities 
 
In National League of Cities v. Usery (1976), the Supreme Court decided 
that Congress could not adopt federal minimum-wage and maximum-hour 
provisions that displaced state powers.426  The Court’s theory of federalism 
could not be consistently understood and applied in either the lower courts or 
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by the Court itself.  After nine years of confusion and frustration, Justice 
Blackmun switched sides and pronounced the Court’s doctrine unworkable.427 
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 expressly exempted all states and 
their political divisions from federal minimum-wage and overtime 
provisions.428   In 1966, however, Congress extended federal minimum wages 
and overtime pay standards to state-operated hospitals and schools.429  Two 
years later, in Maryland v. Wirtz, the Court upheld the statute as rationally 
based, concluding that Congress had properly taken into account the effect on 
interstate competition and the promotion of labor peace.430  Building on that 
policy, the Court in 1975 upheld the short-term power of the President to 
stabilize the wages and salaries of state employees.431 
This mutual accord between the Court and the elected branches came to 
an abrupt halt in 1976.  Justice Rehnquist was able to attract four Justices to 
his position that federal policy had invaded state powers.432  The Court now 
decided that the independent status of the states needed to be preserved for 
“traditional government functions” such as fire prevention, police protection, 
sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation.433  National League of 
Cities overruled Wirtz by holding that a congressional statute in 1974, 
extending wage-and-hour provisions to almost all state employees, threatened 
the independent existence of states.434   
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens wrote sharply worded 
dissents.   In a tentative concurrence, Blackmun supplied the fifth vote to give 
Rehnquist a majority.435  Blackmun said he was “not untroubled” by some 
aspects of the Court’s position, but agreed to offer his support.436  Over the 
next few years, evidence began to mount that Rehnquist’s theory of federalism 
could not be defended or even understood. 
The major difficulty lay with Rehnquist’s assumption that a clear line 
could be drawn between traditional and nontraditional government functions.  
The Supreme Court decided it would not, or could not, draw that line.  It 
delegated that task to the lower courts.  A district court, lacking confidence in 
determining the difference between the two functions, asked the Labor 
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Department to identify nontraditional state functions.437  It did so, supplying a 
list of traditional functions as well.438   
Year after year, lower courts and the Supreme Court tried to figure out 
what was traditional and nontraditional.  Year after year they failed.  In 1981, 
a unanimous Court rejected a district court’s argument that land use regulation 
was a “traditional governmental function” reserved to the states.439  A year 
later, the Court reviewed a district court’s attempt to use National League of 
Cities to prohibit Congress from regulating retail sales of electricity and 
natural gas.440  The district court regarded this area of economic regulation as 
traditional, but the Court said it was not.441 Other cases highlighted the inability 
of courts to understand the difference between traditional and nontraditional 
state functions.442  
By 1985, Blackmun’s patience ended.  His opinion in a mass transit case 
nullified Rehnquist’s opinion issued nine years earlier.443  Blackmun explained 
the difficulties that courts experienced trying to determine the difference 
between traditional and nontraditional functions.444  In one example, a district 
court decided that municipal ownership and operation of a mass-transit system 
was a traditional governmental function.445  Three federal appellate courts and 
one state appellate court reached the opposite conclusion.446  The effect of 
Blackmun’s 5-4 decision was to take this element of federalism away from the 
judiciary and leave it with the political process of Congress and the states.  He 
rejected “as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state 
immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether 
a particular governmental function is ‘integral’ or ‘traditional.’”447  To 
Blackmun, the Court in National League of Cities “tried to repair what did not 
need repair.”448  
 
E. Legislative Vetoes 
 
“As a way of controlling delegated authority, Congress has long relied on 
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‘legislative vetoes.’  They do not become public law because they are not 
submitted to the President.  Controls can be exercised by both Houses (a 
concurrent resolution) by either House (a simple resolution), and even by 
committees and subcommittees.  Legislative vetoes have a complex history 
and cannot be described simply as congressional encroachments on executive 
powers.  Presidents and Attorneys General did more than tolerate them and 
acquiesce.”449  They often invited and encouraged the growth of legislative 
vetoes because they understood the benefits for the executive branch.450 
Political accommodations that had supported the legislative veto largely 
came to an end in 1978 when President Carter issued a broad critique.  He 
objected that this method of congressional control had grown rapidly in recent 
years to cover many new areas, allowing Congress to control agency 
regulations, federal salaries, presidential papers, arms sales, war powers, 
national emergencies, and other areas of government.451 
The case that reached the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha (1983) had 
been handled circumspectly by the Ninth Circuit.452  Acting under statutory 
authority, the House had disapproved 6 of 340 requests by the Attorney 
General to suspend the deportation of aliens.  The Ninth Circuit held that this 
legislative veto violated the doctrine of separated powers and intruded 
impermissibly into executive and judicial powers.453  But it carefully limited 
the reach of its decision, confining it to legislative vetoes that affected 
individual, adjudicative determinations.454  It specifically avoided commenting 
on other types of legislative vetoes, such as those over agency regulations.455 
In the year before the Supreme Court decided Chadha, I wrote an article 
for the Washington Post explaining that some types of legislative vetoes would 
survive no matter how the Court wrote its opinion.  I referred to a procedure 
where agencies had to seek the approval of designated committees and 
subcommittees before moving appropriated funds from one area to another 
(called the “reprogramming” process).456 
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Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger held that whenever 
congressional action has the “purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, 
duties, and relations of persons” outside the legislative branch, Congress must 
act through both Houses in a bill submitted to the President.457   The decision 
effectively invalidated every form of legislative veto.  Yet Burger wrote too 
broadly.  As the Justice Department acknowledges, each House of Congress 
may alter the legal rights and duties of individuals outside the legislative 
branch without resorting to bicameral action and presentment.  The issuance 
of committee subpoenas is one example.458 
Neither agency officials nor lawmakers want the static, artificial model 
developed by the Court.  The conditions that spawned the legislative veto in 
the past did not disappear.  Executive officials still want substantial latitude to 
administer delegated authority.  Lawmakers still insist on maintaining control 
in some areas without having to pass another statute.  The elected branches 
began to develop substitutes that could serve as the functional equivalent of 
the legislative veto. 
Instead of a one-House veto over reorganization proposals, Congress 
could switch to a joint resolution of approval, which would satisfy both 
bicameralism and presentment.  But now the President would have to gain 
approval from both Houses within a specific number of days.  In previous 
statutes, the President’s plan to reorganize the government would take effect 
unless one House disapproved within a fixed number of days.  A joint 
resolution of approval reverses the burden.  If one House decides to withhold 
support, the practical effect is a one-House veto.  That reality escaped the 
Court. 
The reprogramming process continues as before.  Agency officials seek 
approval from designated committees and subcommittees before funds can be 
shifted from one account to another.  In a book published in 2015, former 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recalled a problem he faced in 2011, trying 
to reprogram money from one appropriations account to another.459  He needed 
the support of four committees in the House and Senate.460  A compromise was 
reached to move the funds.461  In another memoir, Leon Panetta reflected on 
his years as CIA Director during the Obama administration.462  He described 
how he met with congressional committees and leaders to gain the support of 
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a reprogramming request.463  In those meetings, none of the participants in the 
two branches give a thought about the Court’s decision in Chadha. 
 
F. Corporations as Persons 
 
In Buckley v. Valeo (1976) and Citizens United (2010), the Supreme Court 
held that campaign expenditures by corporations may not be restricted by 
Congress or the states.464  The decisions assert that corporations are persons, 
money is speech, and corporate expenditures are protected by the First 
Amendment.465  Because these decisions rest on what Justices themselves have 
referred to as “inventions,” with the Court deeply divided in issuing both 
rulings, there is little reason to believe that the decisions represent the final 
word on constitutional principles.  
In what sense are corporations persons under the Constitution and entitled 
to rights available to natural persons?  In the 1819 Dartmouth College case, 
Chief Justice Marshall described a corporation as “an artificial being, invisible, 
intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.”466  As “the mere 
creature of law,” it possesses only those properties conferred upon it.”467  
Natural persons are not creatures of law.  One property conferred by 
legislatures on corporations, Marshall said, is immortality.468  No such 
property extends to natural persons.  On what reasonable grounds could his 
analysis be turned aside? 
The idea that corporations are persons under the Constitution first surfaced 
in the Santa Clara case in 1886 without being briefed, argued, reasoned, or 
even decided.469  Does that sound far-fetched?  Consider the facts.  Before oral 
argument began, Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite told the parties:  
 
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question 
whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies 
to these corporations.  We are all of opinion that it does.470   
 
His remark appears not in the Court’s decision but in the headnote prepared by 
the clerk.  
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The decision by Justice John Marshall Harlan did not refer to corporations 
being “persons.”  J. C. Bancroft Davis, the court reporter, asked Chief Justice 
Waite if his remark before oral argument should be included in the headnote.471  
Waite left that decision to Davis.472  The headnote begins: “The defendant 
Corporations are persons within the intent of the clause in section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which forbids 
a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”473  The Fourteenth Amendment does not call a corporation a “person.”  
Section 1 opens with: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States . . 
. .”  Obviously that refers to natural persons, not artificial creations.  
Corporations are not born or naturalized.  Calling a corporation a person is a 
metaphor, a legal fiction.474 
Over the years, the Supreme Court has made many false and misleading 
claims about Santa Clara.  In 1896, Justice Harlan said it was “now settled 
that corporations are persons under the Fourteenth Amendment,” citing Santa 
Clara.475  In fact, his ruling did not say that.  A decade later he corrected his 
error.  Writing for a unanimous Court, he said that the liberty guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment “is the liberty of natural, not artificial persons.”476  
Clear enough, echoing Marshall’s decision in Dartmouth College.477  A year 
later, another unanimous decision by Harlan said the Fourteenth Amendment 
applies to “natural, not artificial, persons.”478  Had the Court finally returned 
to a reasonable, credible position and decided to repudiate the headnote in 
Santa Clara?   
The record is clear that when the Supreme Court relies on erroneous dicta, 
as in Curtiss-Wright, or in a misleading headnote, as in Santa Clara, those 
mistakes and misconceptions will continue to influence future holdings.  The 
Court in 1888 cited Santa Clara and claimed it “is conceded” that corporations 
are persons under the Fourteenth Amendment.479  Nothing in Harlan’s decision 
conceded that point.  A decision in 1889 claimed it was “so held” in Santa 
Clara that private corporations are persons under the Fourteenth 
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Amendment.480  There was no such holding.  A Court ruling in 1892 also used 
the words “so held.”481   The Court in 1897, citing Santa Clara carelessly, said 
it was “well settled” that corporations are persons under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.482  How could it be well settled when Santa Clara was not guided 
by briefs, oral argument, or the Court’s decision?  
Judicial misconceptions persisted.  A dissent by Justice Black in 1938 
added more confusion.  After stating he did not believe the word “person” in 
the Fourteenth Amendment included corporations,483 Black wrote falsely that 
the Court in Santa Clara “decided for the first time that the word ‘person’ in 
the Fourteenth Amendment did in some instances include corporations.”484  
Nothing in Santa Clara decided that.  A dissent by Justices Douglas and Black 
in 1949 stated it was “so held” in Santa Clara that a corporation is a “person” 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.485  There 
was no such holding.  Justice Rehnquist, in a dissent in 1978, pointed to Justice 
Harlan’s opinion for a unanimous Court in 1906 that the liberty under the 
Fourteenth Amendment is “the liberty of natural, not artificial persons.”486  
Rehnquist added: “it cannot be disputed that the mere creation of a corporation 
does not invest it with all the liberties enjoyed by natural persons,” pointing 
out that corporations do not enjoy the privilege against self-incrimination.487  
An important point, but Santa Clara continued to influence the Court. 
In the 1978 case, with Rehnquist dissenting, the Court divided 5-4 in 
striking down a Massachusetts statute that prohibited corporations from 
making contributions or expenditures to referenda and elections.488  Speaking 
for the Court, Justice Powell said: “If the speakers here were not corporations, 
no one would suggest that the State could silence their proposed speech.  It is 
the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy . . . .”489  
He then added this footnote: “It has been settled for almost a century that 
corporations are persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,” 
citing Santa Clara.490  But the Court in Santa Clara did not decide that 
question, much less “settle it.”  Powell seemed unaware that Justice Harlan 
later corrected the misconception caused by the clerk’s headnote. 
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G. Campaign Finance 
 
In Buckley v. Valeo (1976), the Supreme Court reviewed legislation passed 
by Congress in 1974 to regulate the funding of federal elections.491  As 
explained by Judge J. Skelly Wright, the statute responded to political abuses 
that “culminated in the 1972 presidential campaign and its aftermath, 
commonly called Watergate.  Congress found that those excesses were fueled 
by money collected for political purposes.”492  To Judge Harold Leventhal, 
who served on the D.C. Circuit that upheld the 1974 legislation, the central 
question was not whether money is speech but “the need to maintain 
confidence in self-government, and to prevent the erosion of democracy which 
comes from a popular view of government as responsive only or mainly to 
special interests.”493 
In Buckley, the Court upheld a congressional limit on personal 
contributions to political campaigns but struck down a limit on expenditures.494  
The Court accepted the legislative argument that contributions resemble quid 
pro quos and may invite political corruption.  It then reasoned that limits on 
campaign expenditures “necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by 
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and 
the size of the audience reached.”495    
The ruling is difficult to analyze because it was issued as a per curiam for 
which no Justice took responsibility.  As noted by Ruth Bader Ginsburg when 
she served on the D.C. Circuit, judges generally do not labor over per curiam 
opinions “with the same intensity they devote to signed opinions.”496  Per 
curiams are usually brief.  The one in Buckley runs to 138 pages, followed by 
60 pages of remarks by five Justices.497  They concurred with some parts while 
dissenting from others.498  Justice Stevens did not participate.499   
Chief Justice Burger objected that the per curiam, by dissecting the 
congressional statute “bit by bit, casting off vital parts,” left a remainder he 
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doubted was “workable.”500  He challenged the effort to distinguish between 
contributions and expenditures, upholding one but not the other.501  To him, 
contributions and expenditures “are two sides of the same First Amendment 
coin” and the per curiam’s analysis “will not wash.”502  The statute “as it now 
stands is unworkable and inequitable.”503  Justices White and Blackmun 
rejected the Court’s distinction between contributions and expenditures.504  
Justices Marshall and Rehnquist dissented in part.505 
Conservative and liberal Justices have been highly critical of Buckley.  A 
1978 decision struck down a Massachusetts statute that prohibited 
corporations from making contributions or expenditures to referenda and 
elections.506  The Supreme Court split 5-4.507  A dissent by White, joined by 
Brennan and Marshall, rejected the reasoning of Buckley.508  White observed 
that in the arena of campaign finance “the expertise of legislators is at its peak 
and that of judges is at its very lowest.”509  Rehnquist’s dissent objected that 
the Court should have deferred to the judgment of Massachusetts in protecting 
the integrity of its elections.510  In 1981, the Court divided 5-4 in deciding how 
to interpret and apply Buckley with regard to corporate and union contributions 
to a political committee.511   
The difficulty of finding judicial agreement on campaign finance cases is 
evident by reading Court decisions from 1982 forward.512  Of special interest 
is a decision in 2000 that produced dissents from Justices Kennedy, Thomas, 
and Scalia.513  Kennedy, who would write for the Court in Citizens United, 
stated: “The plain fact is that the compromise the Court invented in Buckley 
set the stage for a new kind of speech to enter the political system.”514  He 
meant that Buckley did not reflect thoughtful and informed constitutional 
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analysis.  Instead, it represented a compromise “invented” by the Court to yield 
a type of speech that did not previously exist.   
To Kennedy, there were sufficient grounds “to reject Buckley’s wooden 
formula.”515  He warned that the “melancholy history of campaign finance in 
Buckley’s wake shows what can happen when we intervene in the dynamics of 
speech and expression by inventing an artificial scheme of our own.”516  
Stating that “Buckley has not worked,”517 he added: “I would overrule Buckley 
and then free Congress or state legislatures to attempt some new reform, if, 
based upon their own considered view of the First Amendment, it is possible 
to do so.”518  Yet in deciding Citizens United ten years later, Kennedy relied 
extensively on Buckley.519  In the 2000 case, a dissent by Thomas, joined by 
Scalia, referred to “the analytic fallacies of our flawed decision in Buckley v. 
Valeo” and said, “our decision in Buckley was in error, and I would overrule 
it.”520  In 2001, the Court divided 5-4 over campaign finance.521 
A campaign finance decision in 2003 stretched for 272 pages, with seven 
Justices dissenting in part: Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, Rehnquist, Stevens, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer.522  Despite chronic problems with Buckley, a plurality 
of the Court in 2006 relied on it to prevent Vermont from imposing limits on 
campaign expenditures.523  Thomas and Scalia rejected the plurality’s 
approach, pointing to “the continuing inability of the Court (and the plurality 
here) to apply Buckley in a coherent and principled fashion.”524  To Stevens, 
dissenting, “Buckley’s holding on expenditure limits is wrong” and “the time 
has come to overrule it.”525 
A 2007 case found the Court once again divided 5-4, this time in holding 
unconstitutional a federal statute (the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, or 
BCRA) that made it a crime for any corporation to broadcast shortly before an 
election any communication that names a federal candidate for elected office 
and that is targeted for the electorate.526  The Court’s lineup was significant: 
five conservatives in the majority (Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito) 
arrayed against four liberals (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer)—the same 
configuration that decided Citizens United three years later. 
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The Supreme Court often invalidates congressional legislation when it 
decides that Congress has provided inadequate justification.527  What about 
inadequate justification by the Court?  In writing for the Court in Citizens 
United, Justice Kennedy made this claim: “[W]e now conclude that 
independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give 
rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”528  Based on actual data, 
experience, and findings, Congress and a number of states have determined 
that corporate spending in political campaigns not only provides the 
appearance of corruption but results in actual corruption.529  The Court 
provided zero evidence to counter elected branch judgments. 
Another Kennedy statement lacks corroborating evidence: “The 
appearance of [corporate] influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the 
electorate to lose faith in our democracy.”530  Courts need to anchor their 
decisions on reliable evidence and convincing reasoning.  Mere assertions are 
hollow, especially when Congress and state legislatures have reached different 
conclusions. 
In 2012, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to learn something about 
the link between corporate expenditures and campaign corruption.  Montana 
experienced a century of “copper kings” and other mining interests largely able 
to control the state’s politics through financial power.531  It enacted legislation 
to prohibit a corporation from making “an expenditure in connection with a 
candidate or a political party.”532  The Supreme Court could have taken the 
case, ordered briefs and oral argument, and had some of its beliefs and 
assertions tested by actual evidence and experience.  Instead, it issued a short 
per curiam reversing the Supreme Court of Montana.533  A dissent signed by 
four Justices (Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan) stated that Citizens 
United “should not bar the Montana Supreme Court’s finding, made on the 
record before it, that independent expenditures by corporations did in fact lead 
to corruption or the appearance of corruption in Montana.”534 
Critics of Citizens United offer two means of relief: the Court could 
confess error and reverse itself, or Congress and the states could pass and ratify 
a constitutional amendment to empower legislative action to regulate 
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campaign expenditures.  There is a third and more practical option.  In the field 
of campaign finance, the Court stands on shaky ground by relying on strained 
and artificial judicial creations and inventions: corporations are persons, 
money is speech, and the First Amendment protects unlimited corporate 
expenditures in political campaigns.  Congress should hold hearings, invite 
expert testimony on the influence of money on the electoral process, and 
produce legislation that is coherent, principled, and evidence-based to protect 
popular control and self-government.535 
Such a bill, if enacted, would be litigated and the Supreme Court could 
declare the statute contrary to its rulings.  However, it would be institutionally 
risky to strike down the statute merely because it conflicts with evidence-free 
judicial decisions.  Instead, the Court could announce: “Congress has 
assembled evidence that was not available to us when we decided Buckley and 
Citizens United.  We now, after due consideration, defer to the legislative 
judgment and override those two decisions.”  If that were to happen, the Court 
would be under appropriate pressure to adopt a more deferential attitude 
toward state efforts to control campaign expenditures. 
Would it be difficult for the Supreme Court to confess error?  It has done 
so in the past, as with child-labor legislation.  In a dissenting opinion in 1932, 
Justice Brandeis noted that the Supreme Court “bows to the lessons of 
experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of 
trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the 
judicial function.”536  The Court is judged on the basis of the quality of its 
decisions, its respect for the elected branches, and how it values self-
government, not on some abstract theory of finality that depends on judicial 
creations and inventions.  An essential test of credibility for all three branches 




For more than two centuries, the authority of the Supreme Court to 
interpret the Constitution has encountered various limits.  Still, the claim of 
judicial finality continues to be pressed by courts and legal scholars.  In City 
of Boerne v. Flores in 1997, Justice Kennedy offered this perspective: “Our 
national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best when each 
part of the Government respects both the Constitution and the proper actions 
and determinations of the other branches.”537  He then added: “When the Court 
has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province of the Judicial 
Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is.  Marbury v. Madison, 
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1 Cranch, at 177.”538  The reference to Marbury lacks substance.  Obviously it 
is also the duty of Congress “to say what the law is.”  Marbury offers no 
support for judicial supremacy or judicial finality.539 
Boerne claimed that when a statute collides with a Supreme Court ruling, 
the ruling “must control.”540  Nothing in the record from 1789 to the present 
time supports the view that when the Supreme Court decides a constitutional 
issue, its ruling is binding and final on the elected branches.  Court rulings 
have been more fluid than fixed.  Justice Kennedy took no note of Goldman v. 
Weinberger (1986), which considered Captain Goldman’s request that he be 
allowed to wear his yarmulke indoors while on duty.541  The case balanced his 
constitutional right of religious liberty against the position of the Air Force 
that it requires uniformity and discipline.  Divided 5 to 4, the Court deferred 
to the military.542  Within one year, lawmakers passed legislation to permit 
members of the military to wear religious apparel unless it interferes with 
military duties.543  Congress had full authority to override the Court’s 
constitutional decision and extend greater protection to religious liberty in the 
military services.  It did so by exercising its Article I power to “make Rules 
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”544 
It is not useful, helpful, or credible for the Court to insist that when it 
decides a constitutional case the issue is closed unless the Court reverses a 
decision or its ruling is overturned by constitutional amendment.  All three 
branches make mistakes.  All three branches have the capacity to correct them.  
Some judicial errors, however, persist decade after decade, no matter how 
many scholars identify the deficiencies.  A judicial ruling is not binding for all 
time simply because it has been issued.  It is controlling if sound in substance, 
offers persuasive reasoning, and is accepted by the elected branches and the 
public. 
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